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How to Combat Prenatal Substance Abuse
While Also Protecting Pregnant Women: A
Legislative Proposal to Create an Appropriate
Balance
∗

I. INTRODUCTION
“Substance abuse in pregnancy is associated with a number
of adverse outcomes for the woman, fetus, and neonate.”1 A
recent study indicated that approximately 5.9% of pregnant
women between the ages of fifteen and forty-four use illicit
drugs.2 Prenatal illicit drug use has escalated over the past
decade, causing an increase in “maternal and neonatal
complications, neonatal abstinence syndrome, and health care
costs.”3 Following alcohol and marijuana, methamphetamine is
the most commonly abused drug.4 By 2006, admissions for
treatment of methamphetamine abuse among pregnant women

The author thanks the Arkansas Law Review editors for their tremendous work and
attention to detail in preparing this article. The author also thanks Professor Ann
Killenbeck, University of Arkansas School of Law, along with his Note and Comment
Group, Caleb Lang, Joseph Hout, Ron Johnson, and Bailey Knapp for their guidance
throughout the writing process. Lastly, the author thanks Brian Johnston, Caitlin Kenner,
and his parents for their time and assistance in developing the article.
1. Ass’n of Women’s Health, Obstetric & Neonatal Nurses, Position Statement:
Criminalization of Pregnant Women with Substance Abuse Disorders, 44 J. OBSTETRIC
GYNECOLOGIC & NEONATAL NURSING 155, 155 (2015).
2. Id.
3. Id. In analyzing various studies, the findings of prenatal methamphetamine use is
consistently associated with small-for-gestational-age (SGA) infants and low birth weight
babies, and it “appears to be associated with neonatal and childhood neurodevelopmental
abnormalities.” COMM. ON HEALTH CARE FOR UNDERSERVED WOMEN, AM. COLL. OF
OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, COMM. OP. NO. 479, METHAMPHETAMINE ABUSE IN
WOMEN OF REPRODUCTIVE AGE 2-3 (2011), https://www.acog.org/-/media/CommitteeOpinions/Committee-on-Health-Care-for-Underserved-Women/co479.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8R3P-7SWG].
4. COMM. ON HEALTH CARE FOR UNDERSERVED WOMEN, supra note 3, at 1.
However, women who use methamphetamine often do not begin and end with
methamphetamine but also “frequently use tobacco, alcohol, and other drugs, which may
confound the birth outcomes.” Id. at 2.
∗
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had increased to twenty-four percent of federally-funded
treatment admissions, up from eight percent in 1994.5
For years, states have attempted to combat this growing
national issue by punishing women through existing drug
prohibition statutes.6 There are generally three rationales
favoring the prosecution of pregnant women using controlled
substances: deterrence, retribution, and improving maternal or
fetal health.7 Support for fetal abuse prosecutions assert that the
“unaborted fetuses have a future interest in their well-being” and
potentially dangerous maternal actions or omissions should,
therefore, be prosecuted.8 Those in favor of prosecution also
contend that, although parents have discretion in how to raise
their children, parents have a moral and legal obligation not to
endanger their children; in this instance, prenatal drug use
injures the child before birth.9 Further, proponents believe that
actual arrest, prosecution, incarceration, or the threat of one
“will deter pregnant women from abusing drugs or alcohol,”
thus ensuring “safer pregnancies and better birth outcomes.”10
However, women’s rights advocates and most in the
medical field, such as the Association of Women’s Health,
Obstetric, and Neonatal Nurses (AWHONN), do not “support
laws that single out pregnant women” or laws that punish
pregnant women more severely or differently than other

5. Id. at 1.
6. Alisha Marano, Note, Punishing Is Helping: An Analysis of the Implications of Ex
Parte Ankrom and How the Intervention of the Criminal Justice System Is a Step in the
Right Direction Toward Combating the National Drug Problem and Protecting the
“Child”, 35 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 113, 115 (2013).
7. Krista Stone-Manista, Comment, Protecting Pregnant Women: A Guide to
Successfully Challenging Criminal Child Abuse Prosecutions of Pregnant Drug Addicts, 99
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 823, 832-33 (2009).
8. Sarah Letitia Kowalski, Comment, Looking for a Solution: Determining Fetal
Status for Prenatal Drug Abuse Prosecutions, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1255, 1258
(1998); Stone-Manista, supra note 7, at 836 (referencing the argument that “monitoring or
imprisoning pregnant women . . . will lead to improved maternal or fetal health
outcomes.”).
9. Kowalski, supra note 8; Stone-Manista, supra note 7, at 834 (explaining that the
criminal justice theory of retribution believes that one who commits a morally or legally
wrongful act should be held accountable).
10. Ass’n of Women’s Health, Obstetric & Neonatal Nurses, supra note 1, at 155;
Stone-Manista, supra note 7, at 833 (stating that the “prosecution-as-deterrence” argues
that if women know that prenatal illicit drug use may lead to imprisonment, then women
would cease in their controlled substance use).
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individuals that use illicit drugs.11 Their argument is that such
laws are an ineffective strategy for reducing prenatal substance
abuse because the women often suffer from an addiction—”a
chronic, relapsing disease”—and the fear of facing punitive
action or being reported to law enforcement tends “to deter
women from seeking prenatal care that can provide them access
to appropriate counseling, referral, and monitoring.”12 In the
late 1980s, it was difficult for pregnant women to find a
rehabilitation program that was willing to work with them.13
Though pregnant women appear to have more options available
to them now, the consequences of enrolling are not clear.14
Further, there are constitutional and social concerns when it
comes to prosecuting prenatal illicit drug use.15
On November 1, 2012, Melissa McCann Arms went into
labor, and, later, while still in labor, tested positive for
methamphetamine.16 After birth, the toxicology reports showed
that her baby also tested positive for multiple drugs, including
methamphetamine.17 One nurse testified that while the child
was in the nursery he exhibited signs consistent with
11. Ass’n of Women’s Health, Obstetric & Neonatal Nurses, supra note 1; see also
Rachel Carlson, Comment, A Gap in the Criminal Justice System, Creating a New Class of
Felons in Pregnant Drug-Addicted Women, A State-by-State Analysis, 83 MISS. L.J. 71, 88,
91 (2014) (arguing that “punish[ing] women because they are addicted to drugs and happen
to be pregnant” conflicts with equal protection, due process, and Eighth Amendment
issues, and wrongfully “creat[es] a new class of criminals and a new crime, resulting in an
entirely new class of felons.”).
12. Ass’n of Women’s Health, Obstetric & Neonatal Nurses, supra note 1, at 155-56.
13. Stone-Manista, supra note 7, at 833.
14. Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of
Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1445 (1991).
15. Meghan Horn, Note, Mothers Versus Babies: Constitutional and Policy
Problems with Prosecutions for Prenatal Maternal Substance Abuse, 14 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 635, 642-49 (2008) (discussing the three primary categories of constitutional
issues with criminal prosecutions: procedural due process and vagueness, substantive due
process and privacy, and equal protection). A recent study indicated that prosecutions for
prenatal drug use tend to target minority or disadvantaged populations. Lynn M. Paltrow
& Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant Women in the United
States, 1973-2005: Implications for Women’s Legal Status and Public Health, 38 J.
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 299, 311 (2013). The study discovered that women who were
economically disadvantaged were significantly more likely to be prosecuted—seventy-one
percent of the women qualified for indigent defense. Id. Moreover, there was a noticeable
racial disparity in that fifty-nine percent of women prosecuted in this study were women of
color. Id.
16. Arms v. State, 2015 Ark. 364, at 3-4, 471 S.W.3d 637, 640.
17. Id. at 4, 471 S.W.3d at 640.
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methamphetamine withdrawal.18 As a result of her son testing
positive for a controlled substance at birth, Arms lost custody of
her child through dependency-neglect.19
Although Arms
successfully completed drug rehabilitation, counseling,
parenting courses, and various 12-step programs in an effort to
get her child back in her dependency-neglect case, she was
criminally prosecuted in 2014.20 At her criminal trial, a jury
found Arms guilty of a felony for introducing a controlled
substance into the body of another person and sentenced her to
20 years.21
In reversing Melissa Arms’ conviction, the Arkansas
Supreme Court held that (1) a fetus was not a person for
purposes of the statute; and (2) there was not substantial
evidence that there was a transfer of the controlled substance
after birth to support the verdict.22 Despite this, the prosecutor
in the Arms case has successfully prosecuted two more women
under the same introduction-of-a-controlled-substance statute as
he did with Arms23 and stated that he intends to continue
bringing cases using this statute.24 Following Arms’ reversal,
the Arkansas Attorney General stated that her office is
“committed to working with the General Assembly to clarify
18. Id.
19. Olga Khazan, Freedom for a Woman Who Got 20 Years for Using Meth While
Pregnant,
ATLANTIC
(Oct.
9,
2015,
10:19
AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2015/10/a-pregnant-drug-users-convictionoverturned/409867/ [https://perma.cc/9FMZ-8H9M]; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-341
(2015); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-303(36)(A)(ix)(b)(B)(i)(a) (2015) (stating that “neglect”
includes “[c]ausing a child to be born with an illegal substance present in the child’s bodily
fluids or bodily substances”).
20. Khazan, supra note 19.
21. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-2109(a) (2015); Arms, 2015 Ark. 364, at 1, 471
S.W.3d at 639.
22. Arms, 2015 Ark. 364, at 6-8, 471 S.W.3d at 642.
23. Melanie Buck, Arms Case Overturned by Arkansas Supreme Court,
MYPULSENEWS (Oct. 10, 2015), http://mypulsenews.com/arms-case-overturned-byarkansas-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/6SGS-L2D4]. Following the Arms decision, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted two separate
federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus, vacating the respective defendants’ convictions
and sentences and ordering immediate release. See Robertson v. Kelley, No. 5:16-cv00185-KGB/JTR, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89418 (E.D. Ark. July 11, 2016); Blankenship v.
Kelley, No. 5:16-cv-00005-BD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92265 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 28, 2016).
24. See Melissa Jeltsen, Relief for Woman Sentenced to 20 Years for Using Meth
While
Pregnant,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Oct.
13,
2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/melissa-mccann-arms-sentencereversed_561bbb8fe4b0e66ad4c872f1 [https://perma.cc/9DTZ-RDSB].

2017]

PRENATAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE

171

that this statute makes it a crime for a pregnant woman to
introduce controlled substances like methamphetamine into the
body of her unborn or just born child.”25 Until the Arkansas
General Assembly modifies this particular statute, it is clear a
fetus is not a person. However, there remains uncertainty in
Arkansas following the Arms case and public statements by the
state as to whether a woman can be charged or convicted under
such statutes based on a transfer through the umbilical cord once
there is a live birth.
This Comment examines whether a state can prosecute
women for prenatal use of illicit substances under introduction
of a controlled substance, child abuse, and child neglect statutes.
Part II discusses an analysis of Arkansas’s first case of this kind,
Arms v. State.26 Part III surveys the various approaches other
jurisdictions have taken in either criminalizing such conduct or
refusing to enforce these types of criminal statues against
pregnant women. Part IV examines statutory and common law
issues left open following the Arkansas Supreme Court’s
opinion. Finally, Part V suggests a proposed solution for
Arkansas and other states that are considering how to best
approach the issue of prenatal controlled substance use. This
Comment does not discuss the public policy arguments for or
against criminalization of prenatal drug use that have been
extensively covered by other authors.27 As a result, the main
25. See Buck, supra note 23. Although the facts in Arms technically fall within the
introduction of a controlled substance statute parameters, it is unlikely that the legislature
intended the statute to be applied to in utero transfers. McCann-Arms v. State, 2015 Ark.
App. 27, at 11, 453 S.W.3d 709, 715 (Whiteaker, J., concurring), vacated, Arms v. State,
2015 Ark. 364, 471 S.W.3d 637. “If the [Arkansas] legislature does in fact intend this
statute to apply to an in utero transfer of a controlled substance from a mother to her child,
it should amend the statute to make its intent patently clear.” Id.
26. 2015 Ark. 364, 471 S.W.3d 637.
27. For more in-depth analysis of public policy and proper remedy arguments, see
generally Louise Marlane Chan, Note, S.O.S. from the Womb: A Call for New York
Legislation Criminalizing Drug Use During Pregnancy, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 199
(1993) (arguing that criminal intervention, along with education and treatment is the best
remedy for addressing prenatal drug use problems); Elizabeth E. Coleman & Monica K.
Miller, Assessing Legal Responses to Prenatal Drug Use: Can Therapeutic Responses
Produce More Positive Outcomes Than Punitive Responses, 20 J.L. & HEALTH 35 (2006)
(discussing the effects of prenatal drug use on society, dangers of prosecuting under
preexisting laws, and advocating for non-punitive avenues to handle prenatal substance
abuse); Kowalski, supra note 8 (advancing three different models for prenatal abuse
prosecution); Marano, supra note 6 (discussing Alabama’s public policy decision to protect
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discussion is whether it is possible for a state to prosecute
women at all under these types of statutes and to propose a
statutory solution to cure the current ambiguity.

II. EXAMINING ARMS V. STATE
In 2014, a jury convicted Melissa Arms of introducing a
controlled substance into the body of another person and
sentenced her to twenty years in prison.28 The state charged
Melissa Arms after she gave birth to a baby that tested positive
for methamphetamine and other illegal substances.29 Although
Melissa Arms originally denied any drug use, she later admitted
that she had used methamphetamine at least four times while
pregnant—including as recent as the day before delivery.30 The
relevant statute provides that “[i]t is unlawful for any person to
administer or cause to be ingested, inhaled, or otherwise
introduced into the human body of another person a controlled
substance.”31
The Arkansas Supreme Court, in reversing Melissa Arms’
conviction, first found that the statute’s use of “person” made
no mention of a fetus or unborn child.32 Further, the Arkansas
Code “expressly limits criminalizing conduct with respect to an
unborn child to homicide offenses,” and it “does not allow a
mother to be charged or convicted of any homicide offense
while her child is in utero.”33 Consequently, the court held that
Arms could not be convicted for a transfer while the child was in
utero.34 Therefore, the sole criminalizing behavior could have
life, whether it be unborn or born life); Stone-Manista, supra note 7 (noting both public
policy arguments for and against prosecuting women in prenatal abuse instances).
28. Arms, 2015 Ark. 364, at 1-2, 471 S.W.3d at 639.
29. Id. at 2, 4, 471 S.W.3d at 639-40.
30. Id. at 3-5, 471 S.W.3d at 640-41.
31. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-210(b) (2015).
32. Arms, 2015 Ark. 364, at 6, 471 S.W.3d at 642. As evidenced in multiple
Arkansas statutes including an unborn child as a person, “when the legislature intends to
include ‘unborn child’ within the definition of ‘person,’ or it intends to afford protection to
unborn children, it expressly does so in the statute.” Id. at 10, 471 S.W.3d at 644 (Brill,
C.J., concurring). “The [Arkansas] legislature has chosen not to include ‘unborn child’
within the definition of ‘person’ for the purposes of section 5-13-210(b) . . . [I]t is the
legislature, not the court, that determines the kind of conduct that constitutes a crime.” Id.
at 11, 471 S.W.3d at 644.
33. Arms, 2015 Ark. 364, at 7, 471 S.W.3d at 642.
34. Id.
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only occurred within the “narrow window of time when the
child was outside the womb, but still attached to the placenta by
the umbilical cord.”35
The registered nurse who performed the delivery testified
that after Arms’ baby was born and outside of the womb, the
umbilical cord remained attached for a brief period between a
few seconds and few minutes.36 However, the court determined
that “the record [wa]s completely devoid of any evidence that
Arms directly introduced methamphetamine into her baby’s
system.”37 More specifically, there was a lack of evidence
proving “an ongoing transfer of the methamphetamine that was
in Arms’s system after the child was born.”38 The jury,
therefore, would have had to speculate that Arms introduced the
methamphetamine into the baby’s body after birth and that a
“verdict [] not supported by substantial evidence” must be
reversed and dismissed.39 This left open the possibility of
successful prosecutions under the statute so long as the state
introduces substantial evidence of the postpartum transfer.

III. CRIMINALIZATION OF PRENATAL DRUG USE
IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
The issue in Arms v. State was a case of first impression in
Arkansas,40 and although Melissa Arms’ conviction was
35. Id. The Arkansas Court of Appeals determined that, even assuming the statute
does not define a fetus as a person, Arms was not entitled to reversal:
Although there is no specific evidence before [the court] to indicate the exact
time that [Arms’] newborn child’s umbilical cord was cut following his birth,
there was some amount of time that passed between the child’s birth and its
detachment from the umbilical cord through which he received nutrients and
fluids from [Arms].
McCann-Arms v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 27, at 10, 453 S.W.3d 709, 714. Therefore, once
the child was born, he “undoubtedly was ‘another person’ suffering from withdrawal from
methamphetamine, which [Arms] caused him to ingest or otherwise introduced to him.”
Id. at 10, 453 S.W.3d at 715.
36. Arms, 2015 Ark. 364, at 3-4, 471 S.W.3d at 640.
37. Id. at 7, 471 S.W.3d at 642.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 7-8, 471 S.W.3d at 642 (citing Pridgett v. State, 276 Ark. 52, 54, 631
S.W.2d 833, 834 (1982)).
40. However, it is worth noting that the Arkansas Supreme Court previously
overruled a trial court’s order that an unborn fetus was dependent-neglected, thus placing
the unborn fetus in the custody of the Arkansas Department of Human Services. Ark.
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ultimately overturned, prosecutors in other jurisdictions have
attempted to combat various forms of substance abuse during
pregnancy by bringing criminal actions against mothers under
these types of cases for nearly twenty-five years.41 In fact, some
states have successfully prosecuted women for similar
offenses.42 The primary theories used by prosecutors are (1)
introducing a controlled substance;43 and (2) child abuse,
neglect, or endangerment statutes.44

A. Use of Existing “Delivery” Statutes for Prenatal
Drug Use Prosecution
Several states have prosecuted women for prenatal drug use
through existing statutes that prohibit introduction of a
controlled substance into the body of another person—also
known as delivery statutes.45 These statutes have not been
amended to include the term fetus but have still resulted in
Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Collier, 351 Ark. 506, 515-17, 95 S.W.3d 772, 777-78 (2003).
The court found that the term “juvenile” did not encompass an unborn fetus. Id. at 518, 95
S.W.3d at 778-79. It also did not find the state’s argument persuasive that “Amendment 68
to the Arkansas Constitution, which establishes a public policy to protect the life of every
unborn child” required amending the legislature’s statutory definition of a juvenile. Id. at
522-23, 95 S.W.3d at 781; see also ARK. CONST. amend. LXVIII, § 2.
41. Arms, 2015 Ark. 364, at 8, 471 S.W.3d at 642-43; Tony A. Kordus, Comment,
Did South Carolina Really Protect the Fetus by Imposing Criminal Sanctions on a Woman
for Ingesting Cocaine During Her Pregnancy in Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1999 WL
393164 (S.C. July 15, 1996)?, 76 NEB. L. REV. 319, 320 (1997).
42. See, e.g., Ankrom v. State, 152 So. 3d 373, 377 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011); Whitner
v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 779-83 (S.C. 1997).
43. See Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1290, 1296 (Fla. 1992) (declining to
enforce the criminal prosecution of a woman for prenatal illicit drug consumption under a
delivery statute); State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32, 35 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that the
legislature did not mean to include prenatal transmission of controlled substances to a
fetus); People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50, 53 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (determining that
prenatal use of cocaine, perhaps resulting in postpartum transfer of cocaine metabolites was
not intended to be prosecuted under a delivery-of-cocaine statute).
44. See Ankrom, 152 So. 3d at 375, 377 (affirming a guilty plea for chemical
endangerment of a child); Reinesto v. Super. Ct., 894 P.2d 733, 734 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995)
(declining to apply a child abuse statute for prenatal heroin use); State v. Armstard, 991 So.
2d 116, 124 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (concluding the legislature did not intend the statute for
mistreatment or neglect to include prenatal drug or alcohol use); In re Baby Boy
Blackshear, 736 N.E.2d 462, 465 (Ohio 2000) (holding that a newborn’s positive
toxicology test “for an illegal drug due to prenatal maternal drug abuse” is per se child
abuse); Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 778 (holding that a viable fetus falls under the term “child”
in the child abuse and endangerment statute).
45. See Johnson, 602 So. 2d at 1290-91; Luster, 419 S.E.2d at 33; Hardy, 469
N.W.2d at 51-52.
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convictions. On appellate review, these convictions have been
reversed.46
Jennifer Johnson, a Florida resident, was the first woman to
face prosecution for her prenatal drug use after she exposed her
newborn children to cocaine in two different instances.47 First,
Johnson admitted that she had used cocaine the night before her
son was born, and the child tested positive for “a metabolite or
‘breakdown’ product of cocaine.”48 Then, when Johnson’s
daughter was born over a year later, Johnson admitted to
smoking marijuana and using cocaine frequently throughout her
entire pregnancy.49 Consequently, Johnson was convicted on
two counts for delivering a controlled substance to a minor.50
The prosecution theorized that, as a result of her voluntary
drug use, Johnson delivered cocaine, or a breakdown of the
substance, to the children “via blood flowing through the
children’s umbilical cords” during the “sixty-to-ninety second
period after they were expelled from her birth canal but before
their cords were severed.”51 The Florida Supreme Court, in
reversing Johnson’s conviction, stated that the Florida
Legislature did not intend to “encompass ‘delivery’ of an illegal
drug derivative from womb to placenta to umbilical cord to
newborn after a child’s birth.”52 Following the Johnson case,
many other states agreed with the Florida Supreme Court’s
decision that “delivery” statutes were not applicable to prenatal
drug use.53
In another example, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed
a trial court’s dismissal of delivering a controlled substance
charge against a woman for her prenatal drug use.54 Although
the Luster court conceded that once the child was born it became
a person, for purposes of an indictment, “at the time any transfer
46. See Johnson, 602 So. 2d at 1296-97; Luster, 419 S.E.2d at 33; Hardy, 469
N.W.2d at 52.
47. Johnson, 602 So. 2d at 1290-91; see also Coleman & Miller, supra note 27, at
43.
48. Johnson, 602 So. 2d at 1291.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1290-91.
51. Id. (emphasis omitted).
52. Id. at 1296-97.
53. State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32, 33 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); People v. Hardy, 469
N.W.2d 50, 53 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
54. Luster, 419 S.E.2d at 33.
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of cocaine metabolites could have taken place” the fetus was not
a person for purposes of the statute as intended by the
legislature.55
Similarly, the state charged a woman in Michigan with
“delivery of less than fifty grams of a mixture containing
cocaine” when her child’s urine tested positive for cocaine
metabolites, and she admitted smoking crack “less than thirteen
hours before giving birth.”56 The prosecutor asserted the theory
that once the defendant ingested the cocaine, it was “transmitted
from [the] defendant’s system through the umbilical cord during
the period after the baby had passed through the birth canal until
the umbilical cord was severed.”57 Further, an expert in
neonatology testified that it was “highly probable that finite
amount[s] of cocaine were moving through the umbilical cord”
between the mother and child prior to the umbilical cord being
clamped.58 However, the court reversed the district court’s
refusal to quash the delivery of cocaine charge because it did not
believe the legislature intended to prosecute women for drug use
that may result in the transfer of metabolites via the umbilical
cord.59

B. Use of Existing Child Abuse and Child
Endangerment Statutes for Prenatal Drug Use
Prosecutions
1. Jurisdictions Where Appellate Courts Have
Affirmed Convictions
The most successful criminal prosecutions for prenatal
controlled substance use have been brought under existing child
abuse or child endangerment statutes.60 While these statutes
have not been modified to specifically include the term “fetus,”
the convictions have been affirmed on appeal. South Carolina
was the first state to uphold a criminal conviction for prenatal
55. Id. at 34.
56. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d at 51.
57. Id. at 51-52.
58. Id. at 52.
59. Id. at 53.
60. Carlson, supra note 11, at 83; see e.g., Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 779-84
(S.C. 1997); In re Benjamin M., 310 S.W.3d 844, 845-46 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009); Ankrom
v. State, 152 So. 3d 373, 376-77 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).
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drug use under a child endangerment statute.61 In Whitner, the
defendant, Cornelia Whitner, pled guilty to criminal child
neglect after ingesting cocaine and causing her child to be born
with cocaine metabolites in the child’s system.62 The South
Carolina Supreme Court concluded that a fetus was a person
under the applicable statute and that the state’s policy of
protecting children supported the court’s interpretation.63
Additionally, the court stated that because “it is common
knowledge that use of cocaine during pregnancy can harm the
viable unborn child,” the defendant had “all the notice the
Constitution requires.”64 Finally, the court found that Whitner’s
right to privacy, specifically to carry her pregnancy to term, was
not violated because cocaine use is illegal and cannot be placed
“to the lofty status of a fundamental right.”65
The Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed another woman’s
conviction when she abused drugs during her pregnancy, and as
a result, her child was delivered prematurely and suffered
withdrawal symptoms.66 The court reasoned that to accept the
mother’s argument that a fetus is not a child, would mean that
“harm to a child knowingly inflicted before birth cannot be harm
to, or abuse of, a child.”67 This would ignore the legislative
intent and statutory language to ensure “care, protection, and
wholesome moral, mental and physical development of
children.”68 Moreover, the court found that the Tennessee
statute, along with common law precedent, “clearly establishes
that a parent may be held responsible for the prenatal conduct
that exposes the child, once born, to great bodily harm.”69
The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reached a similar
result finding a woman guilty for chemical endangerment of a
child for the mother’s ingestion of illegal substances during
pregnancy, resulting in the infant testing positive for the

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 779-84; Kordus, supra note 41, at 320-21.
Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 778-79.
Id. at 780-81.
Id. at 785.
Id. at 786.
In re Benjamin M., 310 S.W.3d 844, 845-46 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
Id. at 849 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id. at 847.
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controlled substance at birth.70 Hope Elizabeth Ankrom, the
mother, argued that the term “child” did not include a viable
fetus.71 Rejecting this theory, the court found that the word
“child” was unambiguous, reasoning that “child” applied to a
viable fetus in other contexts, the dictionary definition of “child”
includes a fetus, and it is common in everyday use for “someone
to state that a mother is pregnant with her first ‘child.’”72
Further, the court explained that their ruling was supported by
the public policy of Alabama, as stated by the Alabama
Legislature.73

2. Jurisdictions Reversing Convictions
Although prosecutions under child abuse or endangerment
statues have been upheld in a few states, many jurisdictions have
reached contrary decisions where the legislature has yet to
amend the statutes to include a “fetus.” Some courts find
extending such statutes in order to prosecute women for prenatal
drug use is against legislative intent.74 For example, some have
held that prenatal drug use is not an activity foreseen by the
legislature when creating the statute.75 Other jurisdictions
concluded that a fetus is not a person under their state’s statute.76
In most of these cases, courts held that it was up to the state’s
legislature to include an unborn fetus in the definition of “child”
if its intent was to include it.77
A Nevada mother, Cathy Encoe, faced charges for child
endangerment after she admitted to marijuana use during her
pregnancy.78 Then, following hospital protocol, her newborn
70. Ankrom v. State, 152 So. 3d 373, 376-77 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).
71. Id. at 382.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 379 (stating that Alabama’s public policy “is to protect life, born, and
unborn” and especially “concerning unborn life that is capable of living outside the
womb.”).
74. Sheriff, Washoe Cty. v. Encoe, 885 P.2d 596, 599 (Nev. 1994).
75. Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306, 314 (Md. 2006) (reasoning that “the
overwhelming majority of courts that have considered the issue have concluded that those
crimes do not encompass that kind of activity.”).
76. State v. Stegall, 828 N.W.2d 526, 532-33 (N.D. 2013).
77. Reyes v. Super. Ct. of San Bernardino Cty., 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 219 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1977) (stating “when the [l]egislature has intended to include a fetus or unborn
child within the protection of a penal statute, it has done so expressly.”).
78. Encoe, 885 P.2d at 597.
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was tested and found positive for amphetamines and
methamphetamine.79 The state acknowledged that a fetus was
not a person under the statute, but contended that “Encoe
violated the statute from the moment her child left the womb to
the moment the umbilical cord was severed”; thereby reasoning
the passage of methamphetamine after birth while the umbilical
cord was still connected constituted endangerment.80 Notably,
that was the precise argument raised in the Arkansas case, Arms
v. State, without success.81
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the endangerment
statute does not include prenatal ingestion of controlled
substances and the transmission of the substances via the
umbilical cord.82 Further, “[a] person may not be punished for a
crime unless her acts fall clearly within the language of the
statute” and other courts have similarly found such “construction
renders the statute impermissibly vague.”83 The court also stated
that this kind of prosecution “would open the floodgates to
prosecution of pregnant women who ingest such things as
alcohol, nicotine, and a range of miscellaneous, otherwise legal,
toxins.”84
In State v. Stegall, the North Dakota Supreme Court
addressed three separate cases in which women engaged in
prenatal methamphetamine use, and, after giving birth, the
children all tested positive for the substance.85 North Dakota
prosecuted their conduct under the theory of endangerment
contending that the prenatal action of “each defendant continued
to affect her child postpartum” and that “a child is still ‘exposed’
to the controlled substance following birth” despite the fact the
substance use took place before the birth of the child.86 The
79. Id.
80. Id. at 598.
81. Arms v. State, 2015 Ark. 364, at 5, 471 S.W.3d 637, 641.
82. Encoe, 885 P.2d at 599.
83. Id. at 598; see also Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1294 (Fla. 1992); People
v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50, 52 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 71213 (Ohio 1992).
84. Encoe, 885 P.2d at 598 (stating that the legislature is the better forum to discuss
public policy issues, such effects of, and criminalization of, prenatal drug use).
85. State v. Stegall, 828 N.W.2d 526, 528-29 (N.D. 2013).
86. Id. at 529-530; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 19-03.1-22.2(2) (West 2003)
(criminalizing when one “knowingly or intentionally causes or permits a child . . . to be
exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance”).
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court held that “an unborn viable fetus is not a child under the
endangerment of a child statute,” and, consequently, “a pregnant
woman is not criminally liable for endangerment of a child for
prenatal conduct that ultimately harms a child born alive.”87
Also, the court noted that if “the [state] legislature had expressly
intended to criminalize endangerment of a child to include an
unborn child it would have done so.”88

C. States with Statutes Specifically Criminalizing
Prenatal Drug Use
In 2014, Tennessee passed a statute making the fetus a
victim for purposes of assault and homicide statutes.89 Under
this statute, “‘another,’ ‘individuals,’ and ‘another person’
include a human embryo or fetus at any stage of gestation in
utero,” when such terms refer to a victim of a criminal act.90
The state legislature made a point to include that “nothing in this
section shall preclude prosecution of a woman for assault” for
prenatal narcotic drug use “if her child is born addicted to or
harmed by the narcotic drug and the addiction or harm is a result
of her illegal use of a narcotic drug taken while pregnant.”91
There is, however, an affirmative defense if one “actively
enrolled in an addiction recovery program before the child is
born, remained in the program after delivery, and successfully
completed the program.”92 The current version of the statute
only remained in effect until 2016, allowing lawmakers to assess
the law’s impact before extending the law or passing another
similar statute.93
87. Stegall, 828 N.W.2d at 533.
88. Id. at 531.
89. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107 (West 2014).
90. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107(a) (West 2014).
91. See Act of Apr. 29, 2014, 2014 Tenn. L. Pub., ch. 820; TENN. CODE ANN. § 3913-101(a)(1) (West 2016) (stating that assault occurs when one “[i]ntentionally, knowingly
or recklessly causes bodily injury to another”).
92. Act of Apr. 29, 2014, 2014 Tenn. L. Pub., ch. 820.
93. Amanda Sakuma, Tenn. Passes Law Criminalizing Moms Who Used Drugs
While
Pregnant,
MSNBC
(Apr.
30,
2014,
7:06
PM),
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/tennessee-passes-law-criminalize-moms-drugs
[https://perma.cc/Z3GN-YWXL]. In the spring of 2016, it was determined that this law
would not be renewed. See Sheila Burke, Doctors Are Applauding the End of a Unique
Tennessee Law Threatening Addicted Mothers with Jail for Assault if They Gave Birth to
Babies with Drug Dependence, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 1, 2016 5:49 PM),
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IV. UNRESOLVED LEGAL ISSUES
FOLLOWING ARMS V. STATE
As discussed in previous sections, opinions are split among
jurisdictions on the prosecution of mothers for their prenatal
drug use.94 Aligning with other states, the Arkansas Supreme
Court determined that an unborn fetus did not constitute a
person for purposes of the statute in the Arms case, but perhaps
left the door open for prosecution of other mothers under the
statute as written.95 The court found that the umbilical cord
transfer failed for lack of sufficient evidence, suggesting that
had there been sufficient evidence after birth, a conviction may
have been possible.96 Further, the court also opened up the
debate as to whether the mother’s actions in these situations is
an active or passive function.97

A. Is It Possible to Obtain Substantial Evidence to
Convict?
The medical field has extensively researched whether
controlled substances are transferred across the placenta from a
pregnant woman to an unborn fetus and child after birth.98 For
example, chemical products from marijuana—the most common
illicit substance used during pregnancy—have been found to
transfer through the placenta and into breast milk.99 Also, there
http://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2016-04-01/doctors-applaud-the-end-oftennessees-fetal-assault-law [https://perma.cc/C3FL-ZCP9].
94. See Ankrom v. State, 152 So. 3d 372, 382-85 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011); Johnson v.
State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1294-96 (Fla. 1992); People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50, 52-53
(Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 780-84 (S.C. 1997).
95. Arms v. State, 2015 Ark. 364, at 7, 471 S.W.3d 637, 637, 642; see id. at 13-14,
471 S.W.3d at 645-646 (Wood, J., concurring) (stating that the majority’s comments “that
section 5-13-210 could never include the transfer of a controlled substance through a
passive bodily function” were “purely advisory” because no party raised that argument at
trial). The Arkansas Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it will not address an issue not
raised and ruled on at trial “and to otherwise would be to issue an advisory opinion, which
we will not do.” Id.
96. Id. at 7, 471 S.W.3d at 642.
97. Id. at 8, 471 S.W.3d at 642.
98. See Grace Chang, Overview of Substance Misuse in Pregnant Women,
UPTODATE (Nov. 2, 2016), http://www.uptodate.com/contents/overview-of-substancemisuse-in-pregnantwomen?source=machineLearning&search=prenatal+drug+use&selectedTitle=1~150&secti
onRank=1&anchor=H96352822#H96352822 [https://perma.cc/9A79-HXGM].
99. Id.
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is evidence that “[c]ocaine readily crosses the placenta and fetal
blood-brain barrier.”100 Methamphetamine, which was used by
Melissa Arms, and its byproducts are also known to cross the
placenta.101
Although there is evidence that a transfer of a controlled
substance occurs at some point, hence infants testing positive for
illegal drugs at birth, it is difficult to determine exactly when the
exposure happens.102 Urine screening, as used in Arms’ case,
presents a relatively short window of exposure, typically
reflecting only days.103 Meconium analysis allows testing for
specific drugs through fetal excrement; however, this “testing is
not typically available on-site at birth hospitals, and results from
outside reference laboratories are often not readily available.”104
It can also be quite challenging to collect appropriate samples of
meconium because, for instance, meconium may be passed in
utero or become contaminated with transitional human milk or
formula stools.105 A promising approach is the “[t]esting of
umbilical cord blood and tissue by using drug class-specific
immunoassays”; however, this method is not available for
clinical use at the moment.106 Although there are several
effective methods of testing for controlled substance use,
specifically, testing of the umbilical cord after birth—avoiding
the debate about whether a fetus is a person for purposes of
these statutes—“the question of how recent maternal drug
ingestion must be in order to be detected . . . has not been
settled.”107

100. Id.
101. Id.; see also Arms, 2015 Ark. 364, at 3-5, 471 S.W.3d at 640-41.
102. See Suzanne D’Amico, Comment, Inherently Female Cases of Child Abuse and
Neglect: A Gender-Neutral Analysis, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 855, 862 (2001).
103. See Arms, 2015 Ark. 364, at 3, 471 S.W.3d at 640; Lauren M. Jansson, Infants
of Mothers with Substance Use Disorder, UPTODATE (May 11, 2016),
http://www.uptodate.com/contents/infants-of-mothers-with-substanceabuse?source=machineLearning&search=Infants+of+mothers+with+substance+abuse&sel
ectedTitle=1~150&sectionRank=1&anchor=H24#H24 [https://perma.cc/S9TU-UKDG].
104. Jansson, supra note 103.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. D. Montgomery et al., Testing for Fetal Exposure to Illicit Drugs Using
Umbilical Cord Tissue vs Meconium, 26 J. PERINATOLOGY 11, 13 (2006) (stating that
pregnant animal studies “illustrate[] the complexity of this issue.”).
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Few courts have discussed whether the brief time after birth
that the umbilical cord is connected to the mother and child
constitutes enough evidence to convict a mother under delivery
statutes, since during this period it is indisputable that the baby
is a “person,” eliminating the argument that a fetus is not a
person. In Johnson, the judge reversed a mother’s conviction
for lack of evidence because there was no testimony establishing
“that any cocaine derivatives passed from the mother’s womb to
the placenta during the sixty-to-ninety seconds” after the child
was born.108
Although modern science can gather evidence to determine
whether or not a baby receives a controlled substance through
the placenta and umbilical cord from the mother, it is not
sufficient to accurately pinpoint when the transfer occurs.109
Therefore, the only time frame to collect evidence in order to
convict a mother under a delivery statute—where a fetus is not
yet a person—is “the narrow window of time when the child [is]
outside the womb, but still attached to the placenta by the
umbilical cord”; this is simply not scientifically possible from an
evidentiary standpoint.110

B. Statutory and Common Law Issues:
Active/Voluntary Act vs. Passive/Involuntary Act
1. Transfer of the Drug Is Involuntary or Passive
Action
Regardless of whether the Arkansas court had found a fetus
was a person under the statute or whether there was sufficient
evidence of an umbilical cord transfer, the state still had to deal
with the mens rea element. The statute under which Melissa
Arms was convicted states that “[i]t is unlawful for any person
to administer or cause to be ingested, inhaled, or otherwise
introduced into the human body of another person a controlled
substance.”111 The statute at issue does not include a mens rea
element, and, under Arkansas law, if a statute defining an
108.
27, at 212.
109.
110.
111.

Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1292 (Fla. 1992); see also Chan, supra note
See Montgomery et al., supra note 107.
Arms v. State, 2015 Ark. 364, at 7, 471 S.W.3d 637, 642.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-210(b) (2013).
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offense does not prescribe a mental state, a culpable mental state
is statutorily required and established if one acts purposefully,
knowingly, or recklessly.112 There is a limitation to the mental
state requirement if “[a] person does not commit an offense . . .
unless his or her liability is based on conduct that includes a
voluntary act.”113
There is an argument that the mens rea element is met by
one simply knowingly administering the drug: for example,
when Arms used the methamphetamine for her personal use.
However, in most cases under the statute, one administers or
causes the controlled substance to enter the victim’s body, a
system obviously physically separate from the defendant’s
body.114 There is a unique situation involving the requisite mens
rea for transfers between a woman and fetus, though, because it
is the rare situation under the statute where the two individuals
essentially share the same body. Therefore, this Comment
proceeds on the assumption that a pregnant woman knowingly
using the drug does not satisfy the mens rea component.
Further, Melissa Arms’ criminal liability would only have
occurred after the child was born through Arms’ transmission of
the drugs to the child voluntarily via the umbilical cord. The
Arkansas Supreme Court determined that the statute “does not
expressly criminalize the passive bodily processes that results in
a mother’s use of a drug entering her unborn, or newborn child’s
system,” and the statutory language “must be interpreted to refer
to an active process.”115 As a result, it appears as if the court
found that, despite Melissa Arms admittedly taking the
methamphetamine voluntarily for personal use multiple times
during her pregnancy, the transfer via the umbilical cord to her
baby was biological and involuntary—a passive process.116
Few courts have discussed whether a mother’s actions are
voluntary in this type of situation. However, as mentioned
earlier, a Florida mother’s conviction was reversed for lack of

112. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-210(b); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-203(b) (2013).
113. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-204(a) (2013).
114. See Yates v. State, No. CACR 98-620 1999, 1999 Ark. App. LEXIS 500, at *911 (Ark. Ct. App. June 30, 1999) (determining there was sufficient evidence the defendant
introduced Rohypnol into the victim’s body).
115. Arms, 2015 Ark. 364, at 8, 471 S.W.3d at 642.
116. Id.
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evidence.117 Moreover, the judge said, “I can find no case where
‘delivery’ of a drug was based on an involuntary act such as
diffusion and blood flow.”118
Another instance occurred when the Louisiana Court of
Appeals held that umbilical transfer of a controlled substance
could not be the basis for a criminal charge against the
mother.119 The court reasoned that the “transmission of the
drugs . . . via the umbilical cord after the child was born was not
a voluntary act or something over which a mother giving birth
has any control by her will.”120 Further, this does not show a
willful act and therefore would not meet the prerequisite
intention of criminal conduct.121 A Pennsylvania district court
ruled similarly, stating that the attempted prosecution under a
delivery statute required a transfer to “another person” and
“some willful voluntary act.”122 In refusing to find a voluntary
act, the court stated that “the inevitable, biological flow of blood
is surely not a ‘voluntary act’ within the meaning of the
[Pennsylvania] Code.”123

2. Should Recklessly Apply or Does Using While
Pregnant Intend the Natural Consequences
Although there is no precedent for finding a transfer of
drugs through the umbilical cord to a child to be voluntary or
active criminalizing conduct, there are strong statutory
interpretation arguments and common law interpretations

117. See Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1292 (Fla. 1992). The court stated that:
The expert witnesses all testified about blood flow from the umbilical cord to
child. But that blood flow is the child’s and the placenta through which it
flows, is not part of the mother’s body. No witness testified in this case that
any cocaine derivatives passed from the mother’s womb to the placenta
during the sixty-to-ninety seconds after the child was expelled from the birth
canal.
Id.
118. Id. at 1292.
119. State v. Armstard, 991 So. 2d 116, 126-27 (La. Ct. App. 2008).
120. Id. at 124.
121. Id.
122. Commonwealth v. Kemp, No. 2707 C 1991, 1992 WL 613723, at *5 (Pa. Com.
Pl. Dec. 16, 1992).
123. Id.
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conflicting with the voluntary act exception to support the
prosecution of women in these cases.
As previously noted, if there is not a mens rea requirement,
then a culpable mental state exists when one acts purposefully,
knowingly, or recklessly.124 One acts recklessly “when the
person consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the attendant circumstances exist or the result will occur.”125
Moreover, the risk must be the type where “disregard of the risk
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard [of] care that a
reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.”126
For example, the Arkansas Supreme Court determined that
a person driving a truck around a curve on a bridge should be
aware that driving on the wrong side of the road presented “a
substantial and unjustifiable risk” that the driver may hit an
oncoming car from the opposite direction and kill someone in
that car.127 Further, it was appropriate for the jury to find that
the defendant’s failure to perceive that risk in that situation
“constituted ‘a gross deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable person would observe’” in his circumstances.128
It is arguable that Melissa Arms met the minimal
requirement for the mens rea as defined by statute in that she
disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that introducing
methamphetamine to her baby would occur.129 Even assuming
that a fetus is not a person for purposes of the statute, she likely
knew that there was a risk that the baby, after birth, would have
the substance in his system when she used the drug one day
before going into labor.130 Additionally, this failure to perceive
the risk could be considered a deviation from the standard of
care of a reasonable person.131
The Arkansas Supreme Court has also stated that if there is
a lack of direct evidence proving the intent or state of mind of a
defendant that it “must usually be inferred from the
124. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-203(b) (2013).
125. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-202(3)(A) (2013).
126. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-202(3)(B) (2013).
127. Utley v. State, 366 Ark. 514, 518, 237 S.W.3d 27, 30 (2006).
128. Id.
129. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-202(4) (2013).
130. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-202(4).
131. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-202(4)(B) (2013); Utley, 366 Ark. at 518, 237
S.W.3d at 30.
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circumstances of the crime.”132 Moreover, “because of the
obvious difficulty in ascertaining a defendant’s intent, a
presumption exists that a person intends the natural and probable
consequences of his or her acts.”133
In one Arkansas case, the court found sufficient evidence to
support a first-degree battery conviction when the defendant
fired a gun three times at an occupied truck.134 The court
reasoned that because of the presumption that one “intends the
natural and probable consequences of his acts,” the jury could
have reasonably found that by firing at an occupied truck his
purpose was to cause physical injury.135
Likewise, the Arkansas delivery statute at issue in the Arms
case falls under the criminal chapter for assault and battery.136
Assuming that Melissa Arms’ actions were passive and fall
under the mens rea exception, there is still an issue of whether
her conduct of transferring the controlled substance via the
umbilical cord is a “natural and probable consequence” of
consuming narcotics while pregnant. Because pregnant women
are most likely aware that using alcohol, tobacco, or illicit drugs
while pregnant can potentially cause harm or pass to the child,
there appears to be a presumption that a mother using a
controlled substance intends the natural and likely consequence
of introducing the substance into the body of the child.
The rationale that supports a finding that mothers who use
drugs while pregnant cannot be convicted for transferring the
substance to their child is primarily based on the fact that it is a
biological, passive act. However, this language would actually
appear to fall under the Arkansas common law finding that a
“natural and probable consequence”—regardless of whether it
results from an intentional, active act or a biological, passive
act—is sufficient to convict one for their actions.137 Clearly,
there is a conflicting issue about which rule of law should
prevail.

132.
133.
2008).
134.
135.
136.
137.

Taylor v. State, 77 Ark. App. 144, 150, 72 S.W.3d 882, 885 (Ct. App. 2002).
Spight v. State, 101 Ark. App. 400, 402, 278 S.W.3d 599, 600-01 (Ct. App.
Taylor, 77 Ark. App. at 150, 72 S.W.3d at 885.
Id.
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-210(b) (2013).
Id.
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V. ARKANSAS PROPOSED SOLUTION
As previously mentioned, after Arms’ conviction was
reversed, the Arkansas Attorney General stated that her office is
“committed to working with the General Assembly to clarify
that this statute makes it a crime for a pregnant woman to
introduce controlled substances like methamphetamine into the
body of her unborn or just born child.”138 Therefore, it seems
that regardless of the holding in Arms v. State,139 it is highly
likely that the Arkansas Legislature will face pressure to find a
statutory solution in order to prosecute women for prenatal illicit
drug use during its next session occurring in 2017.140 The
question becomes what is the best avenue, in consideration of
public policy arguments, to address this issue in Arkansas, as
well as other states.
A quick fix, such as simply defining an unborn fetus as a
person for an introduction statute or delivery statute leaves the
door open for interpretation and evidentiary issues.141 Further,
the Arkansas “delivery” statute provides that one who violates it
is guilty of a Class Y, Class B, or Class C felony.142 These types
of harsh penalties for felony convictions are exactly what most
who oppose prosecuting prenatal drug use fear.143
Accordingly, the most appropriate remedy to combat this
problem would be a specific statute that would address prenatal
drug use directly—such as the statute Tennessee briefly

138. See Buck, supra note 23.
139. Arms v. State, 2015 Ark. 364, at 7-8, 471 S.W.3d 637, 642.
140. In fact, during the 2015 Arkansas legislative session, a bill was introduced to
include ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-210 to the list of enumerated statutes having the term
“unborn child” within the definition of a “person.” See H.R. 1376, 90th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015). However, this bill “died in the House at sine die adjournment.”
Arms, 2015 Ark. 364, at 11, 471 S.W.3d at 644 n.1 (Brill, C.J., concurring).
141. See supra Part IV.
142. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-210(c)(1)-(3) (2013); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4401(a)(1) (2013) (stating that a Class Y felony sentence ranges between ten and forty
years); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-401(a)(3) (2013) (stating that a Class B felony requires a
five to twenty year sentence); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-401(a)(4) (2013) (stating that a Class
C felony violation results in a three to ten year sentence). Arms was convicted of a felony
and sentenced to twenty years. Arms, 2015 Ark. 364, at 1, 471 S.W.3d at 639.
143. Carlson, supra note 11, at 87-89.
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implemented.144 The proposed statute should similarly include
an “unborn fetus” or “unborn child” in the definition of a
“person” for a fetal assault crime.145
This statute would not only expressly allow prenatal drug
use to be prosecuted as an assault146 but would also give states
the option to classify the offense as a lesser misdemeanor.147 For
example, if Arkansas adopted a punishment for either a Class A
or Class B misdemeanor, the maximum sentence would be one
year or ninety-days, respectively.148 By allowing a lesser
misdemeanor penalty—a compromise of sorts— those in favor
of prosecuting for prenatal drug-use would retain a criminal
punishment for the offense, while those who oppose a severe
punishment would likely appreciate that the maximum sentence
would be reduced to no more than a year.
In addition to a less steep penalty for violating the proposed
statute, an affirmative defense should also remain; specifically,
participation in a drug-treatment program.149 However, while
this affirmative defense in Tennessee is a good foundation,
technically a woman in Tennessee can take a risk and enroll the
day before expecting to give birth, then complete the program
without punishment because the statute only requires one enter a
program prior to the child’s birth.150 The proposed statute
should include a strict time frame during which the expectant
mother would be required to enter a drug rehabilitation program.
This time frame ideally will ease the medical field’s strong
belief that prosecuting women is detrimental to the women, the
baby, and society because it deters women from seeking help
and avoiding punishment. This option would give women a
period of time in which they know, regardless of their struggles
with addiction, they can openly reach out for assistance without
the fear of prosecution. The time frame for entrance into the
program would also help protect the fetus—a key issue for
144. See supra Part III.C.
145. See supra Part III.C.
146. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107(c)(2) (West 2014). This statute was amended
in 2016. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107(c)(2) (West 2016).
147. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-101(b)(1)(A) (West 2016) (stating that typically
assault is a Class A misdemeanor, but extreme cases allow for a Class B misdemeanor).
148. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-401(b)(1)-(2) (2013).
149. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107(c)(3) (West 2014).
150. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107(c)(3).

190

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:167

prosecutors and the state—by encouraging expectant mothers to
enroll early so as to meet the bright-line rule which would allow
them to avoid prosecution. As previously discussed, the
different methods in which states have attempted to combat the
increasing use of illicit drugs by pregnant women has revealed
the sharply divided societal opinions on the issue and has
created questionable prosecutorial legal arguments. A specific
statute could, in theory, create a compromise between the
opposing sides of the argument about whether to prosecute
women for prenatal drug use, while providing an opportunity for
soon-to-be mothers and children to live healthy lives.

VI. CONCLUSION
According to the current Arkansas statutory language and
case law, even though a fetus is not a person under the
introduction of a controlled substance statute, the presumed
intention of an action’s “natural and probable consequences”
allows pregnant women using drugs to be prosecuted under the
statute.151 Therefore, a mother who knowingly or intentionally
ingests a controlled substance and is aware that through the
natural, biological process of exchanging fluid through the
placenta with her unborn fetus, should be presumed to intend the
natural and probable consequence of transmitting the drug to the
child in utero. This reasoning follows the thought process of the
Whitner court in that “it is common knowledge that use of
cocaine during pregnancy can harm the viable unborn child.”152
Further, just as Alabama and Tennessee have statutory
public policy in favor of protecting both unborn and born
children,153 “Arkansas public policy ‘is to protect the life of
every unborn child from conception until birth, to the extent
permitted by the Federal Constitution.’”154
Accordingly,
determining that one who ingests a controlled substance while

151. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-210(a) (2013); Spight v. State, 101 Ark. App. 400,
403, 278 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Ct. App. 2008).
152. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 785 (S.C. 1997).
153. Ankrom v. State, 152 So. 3d 373, 379 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011) (citing ALA.
CODE § 26-22-1(a) (1975)); In re Benjamin M., 310 S.W.3d 844, 849 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2009).
154. Arms v. State, 2015 Ark. 364, at 11, 471 S.W.3d 637, 644 (Brill, C.J.,
concurring) (citing ARK. CONST. amend. LXVIII, § 2).
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pregnant intends the natural and probable consequences of their
action is supported by Arkansas public policy as defined in the
Arkansas Constitution. This does not mean, however, that
prosecuting women under the theory of introduction of a
controlled substance to another person is the correct legal
theory.
The more appropriate and less controversial attempt to
curve prenatal drug use, while not deterring women from
seeking medical attention or addiction assistance while pregnant,
is to enact a statute specifically criminalizing prenatal drug use
and fetal assault, while allowing women to avoid prosecution if
enrolled in a drug treatment program. In this proposed statute,
both those for and against the prosecution of women for prenatal
drug use will make concessions to the other side, hopefully
allowing some form of middle ground to be formed to help
address this growing issue for the sake of maternal health,
neonatal and infant health, as well as society as a whole.155
KYLE KENNEDY

155. See supra Part V.

